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Basándose principalmente en el fr. 15, el autor sostiene que para Jenócrates el 
ámbito del nous-mónada-Dios está por encima de la esfera de las estrellas fijas y 
el ámbito del alma-mundo-díada está por debajo, un ámbito éste que incluye a la 
vez el mundo supra-lunar y el sub-lunar. Dios controla el alma del mundo y, a 
través de ella, gobierna también el universo. Se incluye un debate sobre los 
daimones como almas humanas y se hacen algunas reflexiones sobre las 
intuiciones escatológicas de Jenócrates con la conclusión de que el nous en el 
hombre puede ser considerado feliz cuando está próximo al nous-Dios, y esta 
proximidad –en el universo de Jenócrates– se alcanza cuando se vive en una 





Xenocrates, the head of the Academy after Plato and Speusippus, restored 
to a large extent Plato’s orthodoxy and placed a heavy emphasis on theology. 
First of all, Xenocrates restores the ideas (forms). He says that a form is “a 
paradigmatic cause of naturally constituted things … a separate and divine 
cause” (Proclus, In Parm. 888.15-19 = fr. 30 Heinze). If this definition is not 
merely Xenocrates’ report of Plato’s philosophy, we can assume that 
Xenocrates himself retains forms in his own system, unlike Speusippus. Idea is 
not a creative cause, but a cause only as far as it is a paradigm, as also 
confirmed by Proclus’ comment on Xenocrates’ definition. In this, Xenocrates’ 
definition agrees with Plato’s view of the Demiurge creating the world using 
ideas as models.1  
Xenocrates also retains only ideal numbers, rejecting mathematical 
numbers, as circumstantial evidence indicates. Aristotle mentions “those who 
say that forms and numbers have the same nature and the rest depend on them, 
namely lines, surfaces and so on until it comes to the heavens and sensibles.”2 
That the fragment refers to Xenocrates is indicated by Asclepius (In Met. 
379.17 = fr. 34),3 and by the Theophrastus’ statement in which Xenocrates is 
praised for his comprehensive explanations of the universe by deriving 
   
1  R. Heinze, Xenokrates, Leipzig 1892 [reimpr. Hildesheim 1965], 51. The definition, by the 
way, is used by Middle Platonists. For example, Albinus says that an idea is “an eternal paradigm 
of natural things,” J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists, Ithaca 1996, 281. 
2  1028b24-27 = fr. 34; 1069a33, 1076a19 = fr. 34. 
3  By itself, this conformation may be too weak as due to an educated guest that may have 
been made by Asclepius, since Plato and Speusippus are mentioned by name by Aristotle in this 
fragment, Heinze, op. cit., 48-49 note 3. 
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everything from the one and indefinite dyad when “he somehow assigns 
everything its place in the universe, alike sensibles, intelligibles, mathematicals, 
and divine things as well” (Met. 6b7-9 = fr. 26). Aristotle’s statement can be 
taken to mean that because all numbers are of the same nature as ideas, there is 
no room in Xenocrates’ universe for mathematical numbers and thus only ideal 
numbers are retained. Aristotle also mentions the view that mathematical and 
ideal numbers are the same (1080b21, 1086a5 = fr. 34) and condemns such an 
identification as the worst interpretation of Plato’s views (1083b2). That he 
means Xenocrates is stated only by commentators, pseudo-Alexander and 
Syrianus.  
In a crucial theological fragment, Xenocrates considers “the monad and the 
dyad to be gods; the one [the monad] as a male [principle] has the role of a 
father that rules in heaven, and calls it Zeus, the odd, and nous, that is for him 
the first god; the other [the dyad] as a female [principle] in the manner of the 
mother of gods rules over the region below the heaven, and she is for him the 
soul of the all. Also heaven is a god and so fiery stars are Olympian gods and 
other sublunary and invisible daimones. He also says that there are <some 
divine forces> that permeate material elements. One of them he calls <Hades 
because of air that is> invisible, another, because of wetness - Poseidon, and 
another, because of earth - planting trees Demeter. These [teachings] he passed 
on to the Stoics; the first part he considered after Plato” (Aetius 1.7.30 = fr. 15). 
A tripartite division of the universe is presented here: above heaven - heaven - 
below heaven. The same division is also found in Sextus’ report in which we 
read that “Xenocrates says that there are three beings: the sensible, the 
intelligible, and synthesized [which is also] the object of opinion (doxastov"). 
The sensible [being] is inside the heaven, the intelligible –everything outside 
the heaven, doxastos and synthesized– [being] of the heaven itself; for it can be 
seen by senses and by reason through astronomy” (Sextus, Adv. math. 7.147 = 
fr. 5). 
That the teachings of fr. 15 are “considered after Plato” is fairly clear. 
Although nowhere does Plato call the Demiurge nous, he comes very close to it 
(for instance, Tim. 39e).4 Also, Plato recognizes that “in the nature of Zeus there 
is the soul of a king and a king’s nous” (Philebus 30d). Moreover, the Demiurge 
is never called Zeus, but, like Zeus, the Demiurge is father (Tim. 28c, 27c, 37c, 
41a, 42e, cf. Ep. 323d) and king (Crat. 396a, cf. Rep. 509d, Ep. 312e). This 
allows us to conclude that Xenocrates’ first God directly corresponds to Plato’s 
Demiurge. 
   
4  In fact, there is a doxographic tradition that attributes to Plato the view that God is nous 
(Aetius 1.7.31 which is a passage that immediately follows Xenocrates’ fr. 15). Cf. Krämer, Der 
Ursprung, 59; M. Baltes, “Zur Theologie des Xenokrates”, in R. van den Broek, T. Baarda, J. 
Mansfeld (eds.), Knowledge of God in the Graeco-Roman world, Leiden 1988, 45 note 7. 
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As for “the soul of the all,” for Plato, the world soul has a control over the 
earth and the heavens and their movements (Laws 897b). It is also called “the 
soul of the all” (Tim. 41d). It can be called female because the Demiurge 
“fashioned inside it all that is corporeal” (36de). The world soul extends 
through “the whole body” of the universe created by God, to its “outermost 
limits” (34b, 36e). Also, because the world soul is a mother of all gods, it 
should be a mother of the star-gods as well. Therefore, it seems natural to 
interpret the heaven in fr. 15 as the sphere of fixed stars so that the realm of the 
monad-nous is above the sphere (which corresponds to “the place beyond 
heaven” of Phaedrus 247c), and the realm of the dyad-world-soul is below it, 
that latter realm including both the supralunary and sublunary worlds.5 In this 
interpretation, however, there is a departure from Plato’s image because Plato’s 
world soul covers the body of the world on the outside and all that is corporeal 
is inside it (34b, 36de). However, the discrepancy can be explained by accepting 
the presence of the world soul also outside the fixed stars, as in the Timaeus, but 
its rule is limited to the realm of the stars and what is beneath them. Although it 
physically is also outside the heaven, the world soul exercises no activity there.6 
It seems that this overlap of presences of God and world soul outside the heaven 
is not accidental. In this way, God can control the world soul and through it, 
rule also in the universe. In this way, the position of the monad-nous as the 
supreme divinity is enhanced. But also, it shows how Xenocrates does not 
overlook the fact that the Demiurge withdrew from the affairs of the world into 
his eternal rest and submitted the continuation of his work to the world soul and 
other divinities. The outer realm of the universe is the Demiurge’s eternal 
respite; however, the Demiurge does not completely cut himself off from the 
world, but maintains a contact through the world soul, whose part is also in the 
domain of the Demiurge. It seems thus no need to interpret fr. 15 so as to merge 
the two gods into one so that the divine nous and the divine world soul would 
be two inseparable principles.7 This would really require making the same claim 
for Plato himself, which is more in the spirit of the didactic treatment of the 
Timaeus than in the spirit of Plato’s original intent. There are some suggestions 
in Plato’s dialogues that such unifying interpretation is plausible, but they can 
be interpreted in a more traditional vein. For example, the claim that nous 
cannot exist without a soul (Philebus 30c) can be resolved by seeing God as a 
   
5  A. B. Krische, Die theologischen Lehren der griechischen Denker, Göttingen 1840, 316; 
Heinze, op. cit., 75; Dillon, op. cit., 25-26; Baltes, op. cit., 47-48. 
6  H. J. Krämer, Platonismus und hellenistische Philosophie, Berlin 1971, 125, mentions 
different Wirkungsbereiche of the two gods, but he limits the dyad’s Wirkungsbereich to the 
sublunary world alone. 
7  As suggested by Baltes, op. cit., 50. 
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soul with nous.8 The world soul is then created, and it is a lesser soul if only by 
the fact that it is created, not ungenerated, like God himself. 
Fr. 15 calls the heaven a god, but Plato considers only the stars as gods, not 
the sphere as a whole (Tim. 40ab, Laws 899b).9 However, the world as a whole 
is called a god, even perceptible god, because of its structure, its “grandness, 
goodness, beauty and perfection” (Tim. 92c) and because it is filled with gods.10 
Xenocrates espouses the same view when he “considers planets as seven gods, 
the cosmos composed of them all is the eighth god” (Clement, Protr. 5 = fr. 17). 
Xenocrates could only extend this view to the heaven: because it is a structured 
and harmonious whole and full of gods, the heaven is a god as well. 
It is interesting that fr. 15 does not mention ideas, which do exist in the 
Xenocratean world. Ideas are important for Plato in two respects. They serve 
the Demiurge as models when creating the world. However, fr. 15 presumably 
describes the situation after fashioning the world using these eternal models was 
completed by the Demiurge. At that point, ideas are less important to the 
Demiurge. But they can be assumed to exist in the intelligible realm along with 
the Demiurge outside the sphere of fixed stars. They are independent entities in 
Plato’s world and seem to remain such for Xenocrates as well. This is a more 
likely assumption than placing ideas in the mind of God which becomes 
common for the Middle Platonists.11 
Ideas are also important from an epistemological point of view as models 
of true knowledge. Fr. 15 does not even allude to epistemological issues, and 
thus there is no need to refer to ideas. Even epistemologically oriented fr. 5 does 
not mention ideas explicitly. But it does state that the intelligible is “everything 
outside the heaven.” There would be no need to say “everything,” if only God-
nous was meant. It can be assumed that “everything” covers ideas that are 
located outside the sphere of fixed stars. 
Closely connected with Xenocrates’ theology is his psychology. 
The soul is defined as a self-moving number (frs. 60-65). Among other 
things, this definition means that “in the act of cognition, the soul operates by 
counting and computing, while the whole of cognition is at least differentiating 
and counting.”12 This connection is implicit in Aristotle, who before giving 
   
8  A. Drozdek, “The four kinds of reality in the Timaeus and Philebus”, Diálogos 76 (2000), 
125-126. 
9  Baltes, op. cit., 56. 
10  J. A. Wojtczak, O filozofii Ksenokratesa z Chalcedonu, Warszawa 1980, 62. 
11  Krämer, Der Ursprung, ch. 1, makes a great effort to prove the validity of such an 
assumption; but impressive as the proof is, it is still very unconvincing; Krämer is largely 
followed by Wojtczak, op. cit., ch. 1. A dissenting opinion is expressed by J. P. Kenney, Mystical 
monotheism: a study in ancient Platonic theology, Hanover 1991, 27. 
12  Krämer, Platonismus, 349.  
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Xenocrates’ definition of the soul (without naming him) makes a comment that 
this definition is done by those for whom “the soul is both originative of 
movement and cognitive” (De anima 404b27-28 = fr. 60). Plato never called the 
soul a number as already observed by Plutarch (De an. procr. 1013c = fr. 68). 
The definition does have a definite Pythagorean ring, and already Nemesius 
stated that it was taken from Pythagoras who defined soul as a self-moving 
number which was not intended to mean that the soul is literally a number but 
that “it includes an idea of growth” and is able to make distinctions between 
things in the cognitive process (De nat. hom. 17 = fr. 63). However, from Plato 
comes the concept of the self-moving soul, the soul divided according to 
harmonious relations. These harmonious relations can be reflected in the 
concept of number. So, the soul is not literally a number, because numbers for 
Xenocrates are ideas, but a harmoniously molded entity that is the seat of self-
motion. As it was well put by Plutarch, “by means of number and proportion 
and harmonia he (Plato) ordered its substance underlying and receiving the best 
form, that arises through them.” 
That the soul is a compound entity is undeniable because “Xenocrates 
called one part of the soul sensory element and another part, intelligible 
element” (Theodoretus, Cur. aff. Graec. 19 = fr. 70). He reasoned that “if the 
soul does not nourish itself, and each body does nourish itself, then the soul 
cannot be body.” We can at best say that knowledge (maqhvmata) is the soul’s 
nourishment (Nemesius, De nat. hom. 12 = fr. 66). This may be a reflection of 
the Platonic doctrine that the soul is made out of material and immaterial 
elements, and a mixture of the two (Tim. 34b-36c). In this, the soul is 
intermediate between materiality of the sublunary world and spirituality of the 
superlunary realm. Moreover, our nous comes to us from the outside and is 
divine (Aetius 4.5.1 = fr. 69). He believed that “even the animals without 
reason” have some “sense (e[nnoia) of the divine” (Clement, Strom. 5.87 = fr. 
21). The compound makeup of the soul explains its movement and the 
coordinated character of the movement. The material element in soul is the 
source of movement, but this movement is coordinated and steered by its 
intelligible part: soul’s “movement stems from matter, however, not irrational 
matter but reason is the source of ‘programming’ the movement.”13 
Like Speusippus, Xenocrates believes in immortality of both rational and 
irrational soul (Olympiodorus, In Phaed. 98 = fr. 75).14 Also, he places a strong 
emphasis on ethics which was not only a matter of theoretical interest, but there 
   
13  Wojtczak, op. cit., 65. 
14  It is suggested that Plato’s remark –“even if it decays, some parts of the body, namely bones 
and sinews and the like, are nevertheless, one may say, deathless” (Phaedo 80d)– can be taken to 
mean that immortality does not necessarily has to mean eternal duration, Heinze, op. cit., 138, 
141. 
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are many witnesses that his life was exemplary, even austere when it comes to 
moral conduct. Which means that we may expect some eschatological doctrine 
associated with ethics. However, very little is known about this doctrine 
although it is fairly clear that the doctrine is associated with daimones. 
Already Heraclitus and Democritus described man’s soul as a daimon and 
we learn from an etymological divagation that “happy (eujdaivmwn) is whose 
daimon is in a good state (spoudai'o") - as Xenocrates says, he is happy who 
has his soul in a good state; for everyone’s [soul] is [his] daimon” (Aristotle, 
Top. 112a36-38 = fr. 81). To leave out any doubt about the inference, Alexander 
says that good (euj¿) is the soul that is in a good state (In Top. 176 = fr. 81). This 
is not unlike Plato’s image of the rational soul, “the highest part of the soul, as 
God’s gift to us, given to be our daimon” (Tim. 90a).  
On the other hand, Xenocrates, with Plato and the Orphics, clearly 
distinguishes daimones from the gods. They are intermediate beings between 
perfect gods and imperfect humans.15 Following popular beliefs, he 
distinguishes two classes of daimones, good and evil. Evil daimones can be 
propitiated with religious services.16 But, although it is not clearly stated, it 
seems that daimones are human souls. Plutarch says that there are degrees of 
virtue in people and daimones; “in some, there is a weak and obscure remnant 
and leftover of the sensory (pathetikos) and the irrational, in some, [there is] a 
lot [of it] and cannot be subdued” (Plutarch, De def. orac. 417b = fr. 24). By 
that testimony, the “remnant and leftover” can only be the irrational from the 
human soul.17 
Fr. 15 mentions sublunary daimones. Are there also supralunary ones? This 
is not impossible. Plato taught that souls can live on the stars (Tim. 42b). This 
would be a desirable state for daimones, a blissful state to be acquired for 
eternity. If so, sublunary daimones would have a way to go before reaching this 
state. Probably after death the ethical rules are not suspended and the daimones 
would have to do their best to free themselves from the sensory and irrational 
level of life. We learn that “guarding/imprisonment (frourav) is nothing good, 
as some [think] … but, as Xenocrates [thought], it is Titanic and leads to 
Dionysus” (Olympiodorus, In Phaed. 62b = fr. 20). This cryptic statement may 
mean that one –whether as a human or as a daimon– has to be freed from the 
Titanic element to become pure and be moved to a higher level of the universe, 
   
15  Plutarch, De Is. et Os. 25, 360d = fr. 24, De def. orac. 416c = fr. 23. 
16  Plutarch, De def. orac. 419a = fr. 24, De Is. et Os. 26, 361b = fr. 25. 
17  Heinze, op. cit., 83; O. Reverdin, La religion de la cité platonicienne, Paris 1945, 138. To 
some extent, Boyancé agrees that daimones are human souls when he says that Titanic gods are 
daimones among which on the lowest level of the hierarchy there are humans,” P. Boyancé, 
“Xénocrate et les Orphiques”, Revue des Itudes Anciennes 50 (1948), 224. 
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the level of fixed stars.18 The nous in man can be considered happy when it is 
close to God-nous, and this closeness is –in the Xenocratean universe– attained 
when dwelling on a star in the heaven that is next to the dwelling place of God 
that is outside the heaven. In this, the transcendence of God is not compromised 
and the eternal happiness of the soul after shedding its Titanic element is 
assured. Such closeness may even enable some intellectual contact between 
God-nous and individual noes.19 
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18  Or, as interpreted by E. Zeller, Plato and the Older Academy, New York 1962, 601, “to free 
ourselves from the bondage of sensuous life, to conquer the Titanic element in human nature by 
means of the divine, is our problem.” The fragment is seen as suggesting the “divinization of the 
soul” by M.J. Lagrange, “Les doctrines religieuses successives de l’Académie fondée par Platon”, 
Revue Thomiste 34 (1929), 324 note 2. Cf. some remarks on Xenocrates’ eschatological made by 
Heinze, op. cit., 139-140 and Wojtczak, op. cit., 71-72. 
19  Self-contemplation of the Demiurge, and nothing but self-contemplation, as suggested by 
Dillon, op. cit., 24, 29, is incompatible with Platonism. Aristotelian divinity is self-contemplating 
which excludes any knowledge of the existence of the world. Plato’s - and Platonists’ - Demiurge 
does know the world, he even creates it so he must know it and this knowledge may be extended 
to the knowledge of individual noes populating the stars. 
